This is a floor about how the U.S. war machine built a lavish home base in Afghanistan that was n’t needed , was n’t want and was n’t ever used at a price to American taxpayer of at least $ 25 million .
From start to finish , this 64,000 - straight - foot error could easily have been avoided . Not one , not two , but three generals tried to kill it . And they were overruled , not because they were incorrect , but seemingly because no one need to offset a project Congress had already given them money to build .
In the process , the story of “ 64 K ” break a big truth : Once wartime spending gets rolling there ’s almost no stopping it . In Afghanistan , the Reconstruction Period exertion alone has be $ 109 billion , with questionable results .
The 64 K labor was meant for troop due to flood the country during the temporary surge in 2010 . But even under the most affirmative estimate , the project would n’t be completed until six months after those troop would start going home .
Along the way , the state - of - the - art building , plump in Afghanistan ’s Helmand province , nearly duplicate in cost and became a running joke among Marines . The Pentagon could have halted construction at many points—64 super C made it through five military reviews over two years — but did n’t , say it wanted the construction just in case U.S. troops end up staying . ( They did n’t . )
The Pentagon brass chalk up their decisions on the labor to the constitutional uncertainty of executing America ’s longest state of war and found no wrongdoing . To them , 64 K ’s beginning , middle and conclusion “ was prudent . ”
The $ 25 - million terms ticket is a buttoned-down figure . The war machine also built road and major utilities for the base at a price of more than $ 20 million , some of it for 64K.
Ultimately , this story is but one chapter in a very thick book that few read . The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction routinely documents jaw - dangle waste , but granary only momentaneous tending . Just like the extra inspector general for Iraq did with its own paper .
With 64 K , SIGAR laid bare how this form of dissipation happens and called out the player by name . The following timeline is based on the examiner general ’s report , supporting documents and ProPublica interview .
Marine Maj . Gen. Richard Mills ( figure to the left ) arrived at the cold military camp in Helmand responsibility at the start of the surge , and rapidly confront decisions on what the al-Qaeda needed — and what it did n’t .
baptise “ Camp Leatherneck , ” the base was fair free with dirt - floored tent for a few thousand Marines , but would grow sizably as President Barack Obama ’s upsurge of 33,000 troops arrived in Afghanistan . The Marines were taking mission of Helmand and Nimroz state , an area the military called Regional Command Southwest .
They were working on creating lodging , a post office , four gyms , a store and nearly 11 mi of roads — all the necessity of daily life at tumid base , even in combat geographical zone — and commander had of late raise from a tent to plywood headquarters .
But in Kabul and an sea away , at military bidding in South Carolina and Florida , plan had been underway to replace the plyboard with ahulking , 64,000 - square - foot facilitythat would dwarf its milieu in both size and mundaneness . ( And also go down on up considerable big businessman from a new $ 14 - million utilities advance for electrical , sewerage and water that planners had decided was now required on base . ) Even with the growth , Mills was disbelieving he demand the headquarters .
The 64 K building was a part of 2010 ’s massive , $ 482 - million build - up for the upsurge . Although Obama had made empty the flood had an remainder date — scout troop would start to withdraw in July of 2011 — the military was prepping to build way past that timeframe .
In fact , despite what Obama said publicly , the military restfully wear troop speciality would be keep for five twelvemonth and had passkey plans for 10 , accord to Army Maj . Gen. Bryan Watson , who would later be director of engineering for U.S. forces in Afghanistan .
But , at least in the font of 64 K , no one had asked the commanding officer at Camp Leatherneck whether anyone postulate or need asprawling young facilitylarger than a football game field . Marine Maj . Gen. Larry Nicholson , who was Millsí predecessor , say he not only did n’t ask for it , he had no theme it was in the works .
“ We certainly needed many things in those early days at Camp Leatherneck , ” Nicholsonwould later echo , “ but we were very proud of with [ current home base ] , and frankly we had many far more pressing readiness exit . ”
That had n’t changed when Mills withdraw over . He reviewed all design labor for the next two years to evaluate ìthe relevance of each undertaking to the overall return - insurgency missionî and whether the troops needed them .
The 64 K building did n’t make the cut . ( ReadMills ’ cancellation asking memo here . )
pulverization send a cancellation asking for 64 K up the Ernst Boris Chain to Army Maj . Gen. Timothy P. McHale ( pictured to the left hand in a chapeau ) , a lieutenant commander for U.S. forces in Afghanistan . McHale agree with Mills .
The Marines have an tolerable command headquarters , hewrote in a memorandum , so the project is “ no longer want . ”
Later that hebdomad , a third superior general echoed Mills and McHale . Army Brig . Gen. William Buckler ( pictured to the left wing ) sent a memo to the U.S. command that oversee Afghanistan , saying that given the overall Afghanistan campaign program and its scheme for bases , the building is “ no longer required . ”
Three superior general had now come to the same conclusion : No one needed the 64 K edifice . This was the prison term to stop the labor .
The cancellation asking land on the desk of Army Maj . Gen. Peter Vangjel , deputy commanding general ofU.S. Army Central(pictured below ) . The statement was in the end in rush of military structure in Afghanistan .
Vangjel eliminate the advice of the three generals that the 64 K construction was superfluous . Not , SIGAR said , because he believed the building was essential , but because the money for the task was already in deal .
The late calendar month , fund for the surge — including $ 24 million specifically ticket for the 64 K building — had been bless into law . To vote down the adeptness now and divert the funds elsewhere , the armed services would have to refer Congress , a bureaucratic summons called “ reprogramming ” . And no one seemed to want that .
Vangjel agreed to Mills ’ requests to cancel other Leatherneck projection that had n’t been assigned money by Congress already , but not 64K. delete the project , “ which has appropriated funds , and reprogramming it for a ulterior class is not prudent , ” hewrote in a memorandum .
Vangjel turn over no other reasons to excuse spending the gazillion of taxpayer money .
For similar reasons , Vangjel at the same prison term refused to sub the 64 K building with a new request from Mills for a much smaller headquarters . Vangjel later said he was propose that a young bout of approvals would delay the project too long and it might terminate up being too small .
But U.S. Army Central was n’t eager to get 64 K exit . The command wanted to “ move it to the bottom of the pile , ” Vangjel ’s staff member Lt . Col . Marty Norvel compose in an electronic mail . They would wish to crowd it “ as far to the right as possible ” on the calendar , as recently as January 2012 , and “ assure we time this award to support other operational want . ”
SIGAR found that thecorrespondence“confirm[ed ] there was no immediate operational need for the 64 K building . ” or else , “ the literal role was to hold the project for some other possible employment in the time to come . ”
The war machine broke ground on the 64 K building at an inauspicious time .
The Coalition forces had already begin handing control of the country back to the Afghans and would shortly begin pulling troops out of the country .
On June 22 , Obama announced what everyone already sleep together . The drawdown of forces would begin in July . Ten thousand soldiery would be home by the last of the year , 20,000 more would pass on by the end of 2012 . And by the conclusion of 2014 , the fight mission would be over . marine , in particular , would be head out .
At this point , the 64 K construction was n’t even “ 12 percent utter . ”
It was the same narrative throughout Afghanistan . Construction that the military decide it needed in 2009 was just starting to come to fruition . Just like everything else in government , the projects took a long time to hoist through the bureaucratism . Too long for war .
So come August , the war machine in Afghanistan , harmonise to Watson , was “ still building like crazy . ”
Five months after Obama differentiate the country troops will “ go on coming home at a unbendable pace as Afghan Security forces move into the track , ” the military abruptly realized it had to , Watson said , “ take step to get off the ‘ build out ’ programme . ”
Marine Maj . Gen. John A. Toolan , the Regional Command Southwest commanding officer at the time , canceled $ 128 million in military construction projection and wrote that “ the fourth dimension to stop build is now . ”
The 64 K building was n’t on the lean .
For projects already underway , Watson say , the military weighed the consequences of canceling , including “ how much was already obligated , how much could be saved after we paid the contractile organ termination penalties ” and whether the task could be used for something else .
The Pentagon also told SIGAR that at the time 64 K was call for to serve as the headquarters for an enduring presence at Camp Leatherneck . ” But that conflicts with the recollections of other general who said the matter was far from settle .
Watsonwrotethat at this time the military mental synthesis recapitulation for Marine bases was “ very contentious because there was no clear decision on whether [ Leatherneck ] would become an enduring root . ”
And the fortune of the base would remain undecided for at least another year and a half . Marine Maj . Gen. Charles Gurganus , an RC - Southwest commander , said in an audience with ProPublica that when he leave in 2013 “ there were still discourse about it . ”
So whether the U.S. would keep a long - full term bearing in Helmand was up in the tune , and thousands of Marines already were going home . Yet the military continued to establish a pricey , lasting headquarters adroitness at Leatherneck — just in case .
Once construction got rolling on 64K — after Mills was run — the Marines embraced it . Neither of the next two commanders , Toolan and Gurganus , attempted to downgrade the plan .
bind with the building , the Marines modified it to their liking . From September 2011 to April 2012 , they made 15 changes . Seven increase the total cost by about $ 1 million . And they made an mixed bag of pricey upgrades , disbursement , for illustration , nearly $ 3 million for sound and TV electronics and more than $ 526,000 for a picture teleconference retinue .
All the “ campana and whistles ” came from the Marines , harmonise to Watson . ( Viewthe full 64 K price sheet here . )
By this point , the Afghans had take up over security for all of Helmand , and the U.S. had started closing bases and post equipment home . The Marines would presently shutter piles of outpost .
And yet construction on 64 K continued apace , on the face of it without regard to the changing dynamics of the war . Stopping structure at that point would have be more , Gurganus said . Itís a common quandary with wartime contracts . payment often are made up front and half the money can be spent before anything is work up .
Though he pronounce he “ would have done fine with a tent , ” Gurganus planned to move into 64 K once the building was finished .
Finally , five months afterward , in October , the 64 K building was done — but problems with the ardor loss sustain Marines from moving in right aside . Then , in December , the Marines run for yet another modification , this time move around national walls to accommodate a big conference table . The modification added more than $ 341,000 to the tabloid and get more delays .
By the end of December , the Marines who poured into the country during the upsurge had gone home — and no one had used 64K.
Maj . Gen. Walter Lee Miller get off an e-mail to his bosses : He would n’t be using the 64 K construction that was finished in February , but still miss communications equipment .
“ I have no intent to move in , ” Miller pen . “ Many reasons , we are too little … we are move into the fight time of year and it is not quick . ” Any further installation to the building have been halted , he continued , to “ stop the money drain . ” ( Another $ 19,414 lead toward workers for furniture gathering regardless . )
This confirmed , SIGAR write in its report , “ what was already have intercourse back in May 2010 : that the Marines at Camp Leatherneck did not require a 64 K mastery and control readiness . ”
Not surprisingly , the state - of - the - fine art edifice , empty except for the furniture still wrapped in credit card , caught the eye of SIGAR .
It was “ the best construct construction I have see in my travels to Afghanistan , ” John Sopko , SIGAR ’s head word , told then - Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel , after he saw the wood - paneled auditorium , recline professorship for conference and high - end credenzas during a tour .
officer , well aware of the put-on the building had become , had taken Sopko away while he was in Afghanistan to ensure he see it .
64 K interior , courtesy of SIGAR
Sopko subsequently learned that the armed services had been scrambling to determine what to do and say about what had become a white elephant .
The Pentagon told SIGAR there had already been one probe in May and another was afoot . The first investigation had conclude that the best thing to do was to convert the construction to something else , perhaps a gym or a picture dramaturgy , so it was n’t a sodding wastefulness .
But Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford , who was Commander of U.S. Forces - Afghanistan and who would after be appoint as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , realize those conclusions were deficient . The building , he write in his decree for a fresh investigation , “ has the potential to take up substantial attention from auditors and Congress , and raises questions as to its approving and construction . ” He had this new investigation helm by a two - star general .
In August , a month after SIGAR set about ask questions , Army Maj . Gen. James Richardson ( render to the left ) concluded no one was at shift in the expression of the building .
Vangjel was right in deny the Marines ’ request to cancel the project because he knew that 64 K was part of a larger “ strategic vision ” for long - term consumption of Camp Leatherneck , Richardson write in his report . The Marines ’ request for a smaller HQ also proved that there was a need for some kind of deftness .
An electronic mail exchange from Richardson ’s investigationstarkly displayed the permeative military acculturation of unconcern towards price . Although “ as a taxpayer [ I ’m ] not happy with waste product , ” Navy Cmdr . Timothy Wallace wrote Richardson , given how much the military has spent on construction in the unsure surroundings of Afghanistan , “ if $ 30 million is the sorry of it , that ’s probably not regretful in the sublime scheme of thing . ”
In his final report Richardson also heaped rap on the Marines who did not seek to “ tighten or prevent cost ” until three years after the cancellation request .
To bolster up his finding that the building was suitably constructed , he noted that it had progressed through the leadership of five different Marine commanders . He did not advert that three out of five had never been consulted or had hold the projection unnecessary . The first did n’t know about it , the 2nd tried to cancel it , and the fifth arrived after it was done and allege he was n’t going to move in .
Richardson recommended that 64 K be completely finished by adding the require communication equipment and that military personnel be rate to utilize it as their main office .
This passport , or “ practicable option ” as Richardson put it , would cost an additional $ 5 million — more than twice the cost of just demolishing it .
interested that Richardson ’s investigation was not a “ thorough and candid follow-up , ” SIGAR decided to derail in .
“ We were surprised that the solvent we saw did n’t really make much sense , ” Sopko said .
The military was not proud of and immediately moved to quash , or at least inhibit , SIGAR ’s piece of work .
Col . Norman Allen , a faculty lawyer for Dunford at the U.S. Forces - Afghanistan instruction , sent an electronic mail to some program line staff say he ’d favor that they “ slow - coil ” SIGAR , but thought they could n’t .
In February , Allen sent another email mention “ dedication to the command ” and noting that he “ would think it out or keeping ” for people to secern “ SIGAR what they believe of the … investigating appointed and O.K. by the commander . ”
Allen also write that he , personally , has a skilful deal of noesis about the investigating , but he was n’t run to collaborate with SIGAR .
Three day later on , the U.S. Forces - Afghanistan inspector superior general — who was on those email range of mountains — sent a memo asking that “ appropriate self-assurance intervene to discontinue SIGAR ’s evaluation of program line interior business . ” How the military machine conducted its investigation of the 64 K building , he write , is out of SIGAR ’s legal power .
As SIGAR chance upon those text file , investigators were tumultuous , because as Dunford ’s effectual adviser , Allen was in a position to admonish full cooperation .
SIGAR ’s Sopko articulate in an interview that he could n’t bottom how anyone would opine that as an independent inspector general he could n’t look behind the view .
“ That ’s like saying I can face at shammer , waste product and abuse but I ca n’t expect at superior general . Or I can look at fraud , waste and abuse , but not the reason why [ they pass ] , ” he said .
The Pentagon stalled Sopko where it could , initially withholding from SIGAR the exhibit for the second investigating done by Richardson , for model . Then officers defy turning over any other documents related to 64 K , andAllen gloss in an emailthat he did n’t think Sopko “ had the authorization ” to pull them to , and , regardless , “ [ we ] do n’t think we ’re ferment on allow him more information . ” Forced by law to answer , some unclassified documents were plow over on a classified record , requiring time - consuming procedures and limiting who could look at them .
“ I retrieve they delayed this a farseeing fourth dimension , ” Sopko said .
Later in the year , during a summer visit to Camp Leatherneck as SIGAR ’s probe was on-going , Sopko said he see his military accompaniment had been tell not to even drive by the 64 K building with him .
The U.S. turned the 64 K building over to the Afghans . It is wired for American voltage , not Afghan , and the sophisticated fire arrangement , melodic line conditioning and power generation arrangement all require specialized training . Not even the Marines had anyone on base who could revive the A / C. The monthly monetary value to operate the building is $ 108,300 . As such , the armed forces foreshadow the edifice would fast fall into disrepair in Afghani hand .
use serious understatement , one Defense Department text file tell : “ certain engineering , such as those design in the [ 64 K edifice ] are not as accessible to nations in this area , whether because of cost or lack of stake or requisite . ”
Thedocumentsaid there was “ no cognition ” that Afghanistan has the “ basic desire to maintain and operate ” the edifice .
SIGAR ’s last account shell the militaryfor almost every decision it made in the 64 K boondoggle . The armed services , it charge , disregarded sound advice from three generals for apparently no valid rationality . It attempted to frustrate SIGAR ’s examination . And it performed a limited , ineffectual investigation of the project .
SIGAR say that 64 K cost the taxpayers $ 36 million . But its math both flush it to include some costs and sweeps in too much of others . investigator didnít account for the $ 1 million worth of modifications and the $ 8.3 million Charles Frederick Worth of communication equipment set up in the edifice , but added in the full cost of the utility program base and the closely 11 miles of roads — even though they were for the entire groundwork that housed about 20,000 people at its peak .
The Pentagon does not consider the utilities and the roads part of the edifice ’s monetary value , only yield that the construction , with the modification and communication equipment , be $ 25 million .
ProPublica used the $ 25 - million figure and did not weigh the utilities and roads be even though a portion of each was for 64K. Parsing the cost was n’t possible .
SIGAR launch that Richardson “ mismanage ” the inquiry , die “ to carry out a fulsome investigation , ” and had “ no reasonable basis ” to recommend that the military complete and move into the 64 K building at considerable extra price .
“ Not only was the upsurge long over , ” the reputation said , “ but the U.S. had already begun to crawfish troops from Afghanistan and Camp Leatherneck ’s future was in doubt . ”
One startling discovery : Richardson never spoke to Vangjel , the man who deny the request to kill 64K. Richardson also did n’t conduct any interview or take swear assertion from other witness , instead posing questions over e-mail , SIGAR ’s account said .
In an consultation , Sopko said Richardson ’s account — that he did n’t take to speak to Vangjel because he had sufficient information from documentation — “ makes no sensation , and specially not from a general ” who should make love well .
SIGAR , however , did question Vangjel and was n’t quenched with his answers . He told them his decision to deny the cancellation was based on a “ larger strategic plan ” for Camp Leatherneck .
“ However , [ Vangjel ] was unable to place to any document , classified or unclassified , showing the existence of such a strategic plan , ” SIGAR wrote .
Further , SIGAR cited concerns that Allen had , in inwardness , coached Vangjel on how to respond by emailing him advanced excerpts of the military machine ’s own investigation ’s finding .
Allen send Vangjel an email including language from the report that order Vangjel ’s decision was based on the “ strategic imaginativeness of the enduring comportment ” in Helmand .
“ Rather than merely asking General Vangjel why he thought it was prudent to approve the 64 K edifice , Col . Allen appears to have allow him with the answer , ” SIGARwrote .
Mills , the superior general who asked to strike down 64 K and had since been promoted to lieutenant general , spell Allen that he did n’t retrieve being confab about the self-abnegation — contradicting both Vangjel ’s claims and the military ’s report . If Vangjel had talked to Marines before his conclusion , Mills say , he did so “ well below Flag Officer level . ”
Both Allen and Vangjel disputed SIGARís depiction and decision . They each react in authorship : “ I never seek to interpose with legal essential or to coach the testimonial of witnesses ” and there was “ no footing to question my wholeness , ” Allen say .
Vangjel said he consider there were “ significant errors throughout [ SIGAR ’s ] news report and unequal consideration of context of use and timing . ” He also denied being “ coached ” by Allen and repeated his assertion that there was both a need at the clip for 64 K and a long - condition requirement .
In its write up , SIGAR urge that Vangjel , Richardson and Allen be disciplined , and that the Pentagon do training , essentially , on how not to waste taxpayer money .
The Pentagon rejected those recommendations , saying the military already has enough rule to prevent fiscal waste and maintaining that the decision to build the 64 K edifice “ was prudent . ”
The one recommendation that SIGAR and the Pentagon agreed on is a need to instruct service members on their legal debt instrument to cooperate with inspectors cosmopolitan .
But no one was disciplined . In fact , by November 2011 , Vangjel had been push to lieutenant general and take on over a new office : He was the Army ’s inspector general in charge of whiff out hoax , dissipation and revilement . He crawl in in February .
Today , the plushy undertaking serves as the home base of a belittled Afghanistani regiment , harmonise to an Afghan colonel who is a spokesman with the Ministry of Defense . Unable to make use of the gamey - technical school “ gong and whistle , ” it brought its own source and absorb only a fraction of a erectile blank space signify for at least 1,200 citizenry .
This storyoriginally appeared on ProPublica . It ’s been republish under a Creative Commons license . And if you ’re necessitate in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan , you shouldhelp ProPublica Investigate .
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